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remains unanswered."' In order to effect an equitable solution, it appears necessary to provide the ward with such a right where the guardian is personally at fault.
JON HARLAN LIVEZEY

Recent Decisions
Constitutional Law -Proof Necessary To Show Advocating Forcible Overthrow Of Government Under The Smith Act. Hellman v. U. S., 298 F. 2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962). The defendant was a member of the Communist Party and served as an organizer for the states of Montana and Idaho. Among other things, he taught in Party schools, recruited members, participated in the Party underground and distributed Party literature. Defendant was convicted for violation of the membership clause of the Smith Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 2385, 3]. On appeal, defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The United States Court of Appeals in reversing, held that the evidence was insufficient to support the indispensable finding, that, during the period covered by the indictment, the defendant personally had the specific intent to bring about the violent overthrow of the government "as speedily as circumstances would permit," relying on Scales v. U.S., 367 U. S. 203 (1961) . Scales, supra, 220, 252, sustained an instruction of the trial court which stated that two elements must be proved to convict under the membership clause: First, it is necessary to prove that a society, group or assembly of persons advocated the violent overthrow of the government, in the sense of present advocacy to action to accomplish the end at least as soon as it determined circumstances were propitious; and Second, that defendant was an active member of the society (and not merely a nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical member) with knowledge of the organization's illegal advocacy and a specific intent to bring about violent overthrow of the government at some propitious time at the society's command. [The instant case's requirement of "as speedily as circumstances would permit" would seem to go beyond the holding of the Scales case, although this did not control the result.]
In the instant case defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in regard to both of these elements. The court assumed that the record supported the jury finding that, during the period covered by the indictment, the Communist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the government, and furthermore that defendant was an active member of the Party with personal knowledge of the Party's illegal advocacy. However, the court stated that the evidence must prove that the defendant personally had illegal intent, and that without proof of such intent a conviction could not stand, notwithstanding proof of the assumed facts. With specific reference to the factor of specific intent to bring about the violent overthrow of the government, see Scales, supra, 229 (that there must be "clear proof") and see also Killian v. U.S., 368 U.S. 231,266 (1961) . In the instant case, as in Scales, supra, 229, the Communist Party was shown to have legal as well as assumed illegal aims. The court therefore noted that an active member with knowledge of both the legal and illegal aims might personally intend to carry out only the legal objectives; and that to allow an inference of personal illegal intent from the factors of active membership and knowledge of the illegal aims of the Party might result in the impairment of legitimate political expression or association. In the Scales case there was testimony that the defendant repeatedly made statements to individuals that were clearly intended to reflect the defendant's personal views in favor of violent overthrow of the government at the first opportunity; however, in the instant case the court found no such evidence in the entire record. For further information see: 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 104 et. seq. (1961) (1962) . Upon his arrest for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, petitioner requested the "booking" officer for a blood test, petitioner to bear the expense, but his request was refused. Released within thirty minutes, petitioner attempted to obtain a test at two hospitals but was informed such a test could only be given by authority of the police department. Petitioner alleged that his wife telephoned requesting said authorization, but the request was denied. At trial, petitioner was convicted despite a claimed violation of due process of law. In re-versing, the Supreme Court of California held that where duly constituted authorities, by their actions or regulations, hamper or interfere with reasonable and sincere efforts of an accused to obtain evidence necessary for his defense, such action is analogous to suppression of evidence and violative of due process of law. See Cal. Const. Art. I § 13; In Re Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1959) .
The court reasoned that, while an arresting officer is not under an affirmative constitutional duty to assure that accused obtains a timely blood test (In Re Koehne, 54 Cal. App. 2d 757, 8 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1960) ) an interference, by the constituted authorities, with the right to seek such tests will constitute a violation of due process. As provided in 4 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1962) Art. 35, § 100(g), an arresting officer has a duty to advise accused that he may, but need not, submit himself to such a test. Section 100 (e) of Article 35 grants the accused permission to have his personal physician administer a test in addition to the one administered at the direction of the police officer. Unlike the California ruling, it appears that such permission is contingent upon submission to prior testing by the police. . Defendant husband entered into bigamous marriage with plaintiff "wife," the prior marriage being known only to him. Plaintiff sued for divorce under 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 24, which provides that Maryland courts "may decree a divorce a vinculo matrimonii ... for any cause which by the laws of this State, render a marriage null and void ab initio;
." Plaintiff could have had the marriage annulled at equity under 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 22. The trial court granted plaintiff a divorce a vinculo matrimonii and awarded her alimony and support for a minor child, but conceded that had plaintiff obtained an annulment she would not have been entitled to alimony (Baltimore City Circuit Court No. 2, Case No. 92993-B (1962) ). The Court of Appeals held that bigamy was a cause which rendered a marriage void ab initio and, having elected to obtain a divorce a vinculo matrimonii rather than seeking an annulment, plaintiff was entitled to alimony.
It is generally recognized, in the absence of a statute, that no permanent alimony may be awarded in a suit for annulment of a marriage. (October 17, 1962) . Decedent died intestate on November 26, 1960 leaving certain real and personal property in Howard County. Respondent filed a claim against complainant-administrator for an interest in the estate for her three children, contending they were decedent's legitimate children. Decedent began cohabitation with respondent in approximately 1948, while the latter was separated from her husband. As a result of this meretricious relationship three children were born -Adam in 1951, Solomon in 1955 and Gloria in 1956. Prior to the birth of the latter, respondent and decedent were married, although both parties knew of respondent's subsisting marriage. All three children had been acknowledged by decedent. 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 151, provides: "Any children born of parents who have been the subject of a marriage ceremony with each other shall be deemed to be the legitimate issue of such parents, whether or not it is subsequently determined or can be determined, that the marriage is, or might be, legally invalid because of the prior marital status of one of the parents." The Court held that the child born subsequent to the marriage was the legitimate child of decedent. By reading 8 MD. CODE (1957) Ct. 1963) . Defendant attorney was approached by a newspaper concerning a news story about him, his law practice and his recently constructed office building. Defendant submitted to an interview and an essentially biographical article was published. The article described the manner in which defendant's office was organized and how cases were handled, comments of judges and lawyers about his methods and results accomplished for his clients, and the time that defendant spent in lecturing legal associations about his organization and method of handling negligence cases. As a result of the publication, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the defendant. Canon 27 prohibits, "Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] The Supreme Court of Florida, in defining "selflaudation" as conduct which offends the traditions and lowers the tone of the profession, held that defendant had not violated Canon 27 by submitting to an interview by a representative of news media and by allowing publication of an article which was primarily a "news story" and "biographical" in nature. While conceding that Canon 27 does not prohibit an attorney from submitting to a requested interview, the dissent stated the Canon requires an attorney, who does submit to such an interview, to reserve the privilege to review an article before publication, and, if he fails to do this and the article offends the Canon, the attorney will be subject to disciplinary action. Crim. Proc. § 684-a). While conceding that paternity of the child was not in issue in this proceeding (as, indeed, the fact of sexual relations with others would not be a defense to a charge of statutory rape) and without discussing whether the use of such blood tests would involve extrinsic impeachment on a collateral issue, the Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Kings Co., Part I held that in the prosecution of an offense wherein the credibility of the complainant is of "utmost importance" and where the corroborative evidence connecting the defendant with the crime is entirely circumstantial, evidence which would exclude the defendant as a possible father of the child is competent and relevant on the issue of complainant's credibility. In accord, see : People v. Bynon, 146 Cal. App. 2d 7, 303 P. 2d 75 (1956) . It is to be noted that the results of the tests would be admissible to contradict a critical part of her testimony about which she could not be mistaken. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § § 36, 47. In Maryland, under 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 12, § 20, in effect since 1941, a defendant in a bastardy proceeding who denies he is the father of a child has the right to demand blood tests, but the statute "has no application whatever in other classes of cases." See dictum in Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 449, 45 A. 2d 85 (1945) ; see also Bowen, Blood Tests and Disputed Parentage, 18 Md. L. Rev. 111 (1958) . In addition to bastardy proceedings, blood test results have also been admitted in criminal cases to identify blood as that of a particular person. Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A. 2d 289 (1948) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) § 177; ANNO. 46 A.L.R. 2d 1000 ANNO. 46 A.L.R. 2d , 1025 ANNO. 46 A.L.R. 2d -27 (1956 Testimony indicated defendant-insured and the driver of another vehicle were "racing" automobiles on a highway at the time an accident occurred. Plaintiff-insurer brought action for a declaratory judgment that it was not required to defend action against insured because of a clause in the policy excluding coverage "to any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, or while being operated in any prearranged race or competitive speed test, or while rented or leased to others." (Emphasis added.) After submitting the question of the meaning of the indicated phrase to the jury, without instruction or guidance, the trial judge set aside a verdict that insured was engaged in a prearranged race or competitive speed test within the meaning of the clause and found, as a matter of law, that the exclusion referred only to sports contests providing profits, awards or other gains to participants. On appeal, the Ap- 
